# Exploit Title: Thomson Reuters Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 Local Privilege
Escalation/Code Execution
# Date: 12/1/14
# Exploit Author: singularitysec@gmail.com
# Vendor Homepage: https://cs.thomsonreuters.com
# Version: Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 Local Privilege Escalation/Code
Execution
# Tested on: Windows XP -> Windows 7, Windows 8
# CVE : 2014-9141
Product Affected:
Fixed Assets CS <=13.1.4 (Workstation Install)
Note: 2003/2008 Terminal Services/Published apps **may** be vulnerable,
depending on system configuration.
This vulnerability has been reference checked against multiple
installs. This configuration was identical across all systems and each
version encountered.
Executables/Services:
C:\WinCSI\Tools\connectbgdl.exe
Attack Detail:
The Fixed Assets CS installer places a system startup item at
C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Startup
Which then executes the utility at C:\WinCSI\Tools\connectbgdl.exe.
The executables that are installed, by default, allow AUTHENTICATED USERS
to modify, replace or alter the file.
This would allow an attacker to inject their code or replace the executable
and have it run in the context
of an authenticated user.
An attacker can use this to escalate privileges to the highest privileged
level of user to sign on to the system. This would require them to stop the
vulnerable executable
or reboot the system. The executable appears to only allow on instance to
be executed at a time by default, the attacker would need to restart or
kill the process. These are the default settings for this process.
This could compromise a machine on which it was
installed, giving the process/attacker access to the machine in
question or execute code as that user.
An attacker can replace the file or append code to the
executable, reboot the system or kill the process and it would then
compromise the machine when a higher privileged user (administrator) logged
in.
This affects workstation builds. It may be possible on legacy
servers/published application platforms but this was not tested.
Remediation:
Remove the modify/write permissions on the executables to allow only
privileged users to alter the files.
Apply vendor patch when distributed.
Vulnerability Discovered: 11/27/2014
Vendor Notified: 12/1/2014
Website: www.information-paradox.net
This vulnerability was discovered by singularitysec@gmail.com. Please
credit the author in all references to this exploit.